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My article is dedicated to philosophy of the relationships between people. I think it is 
one of the most interesting, important and serious problems. It is so because we live in the 
century of the IT and all kinds of work and duties people try to charge to the modern 
technologies and this process has gone too far that we do not imagine ourselves without it. 
People have changed mentally a lot. Moreover changing of priorities has led to the loss of 
veritable meanings of such words as love and friendship. 
I have become acquainted with different sources dedicated to this theme and in my 
article I will try to go carefully into true meanings of these human phenomena and understand 
them. The problem of the relationships relates to the so-called eternal problems in philosophy. 
So there are not unambiguous interpretations of it. The sources of this problem go back to the 
Antique Philosophy exactly to Plato’s, Aristotle’s and Socrate’s works and I am going to clear 
up the nature of these phenomena using the ideas of these philosophers and some modern 
conceptions. 
When approaching the notion of friendship, our first problem is, as Graham Allan has 
commented, that there is a lack of firmly agreed and socially acknowledged criteria for what 
makes a person a friend. In one setting we may describe someone as a friend, in another the 
label may seem less appropriate. We may have a very thin understanding of what friendship 
entails. For example, Bellah, drawing upon Aristotle, suggest that the traditional idea of 
friendship has three components: “Friends must enjoy each other’s company, they must be 
useful to one another, and they must share a common commitment to the good”. In 
contemporary western societies, it is suggested, we tend to define friendship in terms of the 
first component, and find the notion of utility a difficult to place within friendship. 
Many contemporary writers in the west tend to present friendship as private, 
voluntary, and happening between autonomous individuals. According to this view 
“friendship becomes a special relationship between two equal individuals involved in a 
uniquely constituted dyad” (Bell and Coleman). This contrasts in key respects with the 
classical view, and, as we will see, derives from a particular view of selfhood. Furthermore, as 
Graham Allan has argued, relationships that are often presented as voluntary, informal and 
personal, still operate within the constraints of class, gender, age, ethnicity and geography – 
and this places a considerable question against the idea that friendship is a matter of choice. 
Two classical views of friendship 
Aristotle provides us with one of the great discussions of friendship. He distinguishes 
between what he believes to be genuine friendships and two other forms: one based on mutual 
usefulness, the other on pleasure. 
There are three kinds of friendship. 
Friendship based on utility. Utility is an impermanent thing: it changes according to 
circumstances. So with the disappearance of the ground for friendship, the friendship also 
breaks up, because that was what kept it alive. Friendships of this kind seem to occur most 
frequently between the elderly (because at their age what they want is not pleasure but utility) 
and those in middle or early life who are pursuing their own advantage. Such persons do not 
spend much time together, because sometimes they do not even like one another, and 
therefore feel no need of such an association unless they are mutually useful. 
Friendship based on pleasure. Friendship between the young is thought to be 
grounded on pleasure, because the lives of the young are regulated by their feelings, and their 
chief interest is in their own pleasure and the opportunity of the moment. With advancing 
years, however, their tastes change too, so that they are quick to make and to break 
friendships; because their affection changes just as the things that please them do and this sort 
of pleasure changes rapidly. 
Perfect friendship is based on goodness. Only the friendship of those who are good, 
and similar in their goodness, is perfect. For these people each alike wish good for the other 
qua good, and they are good in themselves. And it is those who desire the good of their 
friends for the friends’ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what 
he is, and not for any incidental quality. 
Some modern views of friendship 
A good deal of sociological comment about friendship is based on the assumption that 
a traditional society characterized by face-to-face and largely convivial relationships has been 
replaced by a more competitive and individualistic one. In this respect the work of Ferdinand 
Tönnies (1887) is often cited. He saw friendship (along with kinship and place) as one of the 
three pillars of traditional community that were disrupted by the rise of the more impersonal 
forms of society associated with industrialization, urbanization and capitalism. Just whether 
traditional communities were of this nature is, however, doubtful. There are significant 
indications that friendships in the periods prior to large-scale industrialization in countries like 
England were often instrumental. Relationships were frequently characterized by considerable 
caution and suspicion. Ray Pahl draws upon the innovative analysis of the emerging 
commercial-industrial society by Allan Silver to demonstrate that while there was a 
significant shift amongst many groups in society in their experience and appreciation of 
friendship. 
The experience of friendship today 
It might be thought that with the vast numbers of community studies and 
ethnographies that appeared in the twentieth century that we would have, by now, a rich 
appreciation of the developing state of friendship within different societies. Unfortunately, 
with just a few exceptions, much of the research undertaken has involved the use of fairly 
rudimentary tools and models and the basis of our knowledge about the contemporary 
situation is relatively slim. We can, however, make a number of fairly obvious points. These 
tend to run from a central appreciation that friendship is wrapped up with other aspects of 
people’s social and economic lives. Friendship tends to be a product of time and place. Here it 
is important to note three points. 
There are significant differences in the ways that different social groups organize 
their “friendlike” ties. Research studies tend to highlight, for example, contrasts in the way 
that those in the middle and working classes name and develop their friendships. 
Whilst there is the possibility of over-emphasizing gender differences in 
friendship patterns and content, there do, nevertheless, appear to be some important 
differences. 
Our experience of friendship alters with age. 
Friendship can be viewed as personal and freely entered into – but it is formed in 
particular social, economic and cultural circumstances and this has a very significant impact 
upon the people we meet, and our ability to engage in different activities. It is of profound 
social as well as individual significance. Through friendship we gain practical and emotional 
support, and an important contribution to our personal identities. Friendship also helps us to 
integrate us into the public realm and act as a resource for managing some of the mundane 
and exceptional events that confront us in our lives. 
The philosophical treatment of love transcends a variety of sub-disciplines including 
epistemology, metaphysics, religion, human nature, politics and ethics. Often statements or 
arguments concerning love, its nature and role in human life for example, connect to one or 
all the central theories of philosophy, and is often compared with, or examined in the context 
of, the philosophies of sex and gender. The task of a philosophy of love is to present the 
appropriate issues in a cogent manner, drawing on relevant theories of human nature, desire, 
ethics, and so on. 
The nature of love: eros, philia, and agape 
The philosophical discussion regarding love logically begins with questions 
concerning its nature. This implies that love has a “nature”, a proposition that some may 
oppose arguing that love is conceptually irrational, in the sense that it cannot be described in 
rational or meaningful propositions. For such critics, who are presenting a metaphysical and 
epistemological argument, love may be an ejection of emotions that defy rational 
examination; on the other hand, some languages, such as Papuan do not even admit the 
concept, which negates the possibility of a philosophical examination. In English, the word 
“love”, which is derived from Germanic forms of the Sanskrit lubh (desire), is broadly 
defined and hence imprecise, which generates first order problems of definition and meaning, 
which are resolved to some extent by the reference to the Greek terms eros, philia, and agape. 
The nature of love: further conceptual considerations 
Presuming love has a nature, it should be, to some extent at least, describable within 
the concepts of language. But what is meant by an appropriate language of description may be 
as philosophically beguiling as love itself. Such considerations invoke the philosophy of 
language, of the relevance and appropriateness of meanings, but they also provide the analysis 
of “love” with its first principles. Does it exist and if so, is it knowable, comprehensible, and 
describable? Love may be knowable and comprehensible to others, as understood in the 
phrases, “I am in love”, “I love you”, but what “love” means in these sentences may not be 
analyzed further: that is, the concept “love” is irreducible, an axiomatic, or self-evident, state 
of affairs that warrants no further intellectual intrusion, an apodictic category perhaps, that a 
Kantian may recognize. 
The epistemology of love asks how we may know love, how we may understand it, 
whether it is possible or plausible to make statements about others or ourselves being in love 
(which touches on the philosophical issue of private knowledge versus public behavior). 
Again, the epistemology of love is intimately connected to the philosophy of language and 
theories of the emotions. If love is purely an emotional condition, it is plausible to argue that 
it remains a private phenomenon incapable of being accessed by others, except through an 
expression of language, and language may be a poor indicator of an emotional state both for 
the listener and the subject. Emotivists would hold that a statement such as “I am in love” is 
irreducible to other statements because it is a nonpropositional utterance, hence its veracity is 
beyond examination. Phenomenologists may similarly present love as a non-cognitive 
phenomenon. Scheler, for example, toys with Plato’s Ideal love, which is cognitive, claiming: 
“love itself… brings about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object – just 
as if it were streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any exertion (even of 
wishing) on the part of the lover”. The lover is passive before the beloved. 
Love: ethics and politics 
The ethical aspects in love involve the moral appropriateness of loving, and the forms 
it should or should not take. The subject area raises such questions as: is it ethically 
acceptable to love an object, or to love oneself? Is love to oneself or to another a duty? Should 
the ethically minded person aim to love all people equally? Is partial love morally acceptable 
or permissible (that is, not right, but excusable)? Should love only involve those with whom 
the agent can have a meaningful relationship? Should love aim to transcend sexual desire or 
physical appearances? May notions of romantic, sexual love apply to same sex couples? Some 
of the subject area naturally spills into the ethics of sex, which deals with the appropriateness 
of sexual activity, reproduction, hetero and homosexual activity, and so on. 
In the area of political philosophy, love can be studied from a variety of perspectives. 
For example, some may see love as an instantiation of social dominance by one group (males) 
over another (females), in which the socially constructed language and etiquette of love is 
designed to empower men and disempower women. On this theory, love is a product of 
patriarchy, and acts analogously to Karl Marx’s view of religion (the opiate of the people) that 
love is the opiate of women. The implication is that were they to shrug off the language and 
notions of “love”, “being in love”, “loving someone” and so on, they would be empowered. 
The theory is often attractive to feminists and Marxists, who view social relations (and the 
entire panoply of culture, language, politics, institutions) as reflecting deeper social structures 
that divide people into classes, sexes, and races. 
We have touched on some of the main elements of the philosophy of love and 
friendship. It reaches into many philosophical fields, notably theories of human nature, the 
self, and of the mind. 
  
